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The EU-Turkey-Statement proposes to reduce arrival rates and deaths 
in the sea by subjecting individuals who arrive on Greek islands after 
20 March 2016 to fast-track asylum procedures and, in the case of 
negative decisions, to returns to Turkey. In exchange, EU member 
states have agreed to take one Syrian refugee from Turkey for every 
Syrian readmitted from Greece to Turkey. The Statement builds on 
the deterrent effect of returns and turns high return rates into an 
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tiated by Ilse van Liempt at the University of Utrecht and financed by the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). We thank project members Annelies 
Zoomers, Orcun Ulusoy, Harald Glöde and Saima Hassan, as well as Thomas Spi-
jkerboer, Kleio Nikolopoulou, Valeria Hänsel, Lorraine Leete and the anonymous 
reviewer for their input and critical reflections. Last, but not least, we would like to 
thank our interview respondents. If you have any comments about this policy brief, 
please get in touch with the team of authors under m.j.alpes@gmail.com.
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indicator for a successful border policy. This policy brief 
examines the impact of the Statement’s focus on returns 
for people seeking asylum in Greece. The analysis draws 
on interviews with asylum seekers and practitioners, 
phone interviews with people who were returned from 
the Greek islands following the EU-Turkey Statement, as 
well as on participant observations at refugee camps and 
inter-agency meetings on Lesbos and Chios in July and 
August 2017.2
While people who arrive on the Greek islands have the 
right to apply for asylum, the Statement’s focus on returns 
has lead to a series of human rights violations there. First, 
the EU-Turkey Statement encourages discrimination and 
detention on grounds of nationality. As a result, access 
chances for individuals from nationality groups with 
low recognition rates are deteriorating. Second, delays in 
asylum procedures and poor living conditions in hotpots 
have resulted in asylum seekers and prima facie refugees 
losing hope and concluding that access to asylum in 
Europe may no longer be possible for them. With no 
other alternatives at hand, some have felt obliged to accept 
returns to either Turkey or to their countries of origin. 
Third, there are important barriers to comprehensive 
and effective human rights monitoring for people in pre-
removal proceedings after negative asylum decisions. As 
a result, the Greek authorities and the UN are not always 
in a position to guarantee that the returns from the Greek 
islands do not violate people’s right to access asylum. 
The Statement Prioritises Returns from 
Greece
Only 1,360 people were returned from Greece to 
Turkey up until October 2017.3 But the Statement’s 
focus on returns has changed the organizational 
logic of asylum applications for all 37,000 people 
who arrived on the Greek islands since April 20164. 
2. The policy brief draws on observations at refugee camps (Moria, 
Vial, Souda, Pikpa), 11 interviews with asylum seekers on Greek 
islands (Lesbos and Chios) and 20 phone interviews concerning 37 
returned individuals. The researchers also observed inter-agency 
and coordination meetings (4) and interviewed lawyers (3 Turkish, 5 
Greek), practitioners working at international NGOs (4), representa-
tives of UN and EU institutions (9) and civil servants working with 
the Greek police and local municipalities on Chios and Lesbos (4).
3. UNHCR, 06/10/17, Returns from Greece to Turkey, retrieved 
from: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60306
4. Amnesty International, 14 July 2017, Greece: Lives on Hold. 
Update on Situation of Refugees and Migrants on the Greek Islands, 
Public Statement. AI Index: EUR 25/6745/2017, retrieved from 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur25/6745/2017/en/
Before the EU-Turkey Statement asylum seekers were 
free to travel to the mainland to lodge their asylum 
claims there. Now, people are obliged to apply for asylum 
in separate ‘border procedures’ in so-called hotspots. 
People are only allowed to travel to the mainland to 
access standard asylum procedures if they are recognised 
as being vulnerable. Reception conditions and access 
to legal assistance is slightly less poor on the Greek 
mainland. As a result, people’s access to protection 
has become partially dependent on being classified as 
‘vulnerable’.5
The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and 
the Greek Asylum Service (GAS) do not manage their 
asylum caseload predominantly on grounds of the 
date when people apply. Instead, EASO and GAS apply 
different procedures to an individual asylum application 
according to his or her country of nationality. They 
further differentiate nationality groups according to 
asylum recognition rates below 25%, above 25% or above 
75%. When and how an individual assessment takes 
place depends on these categorisations.
Syrians and individuals from nationality groups with 
recognition rates above 75% are generally subject to 
admissibility procedures based on the safe-third-country 
concept. In such an admissibility assessment, authorities 
do not examine whether asylum can be granted, but 
whether an application will be accepted. By subjecting 
these asylum applicants to potential referrals to third 
countries, GAS and EASO postpone the examination of 
whether an asylum applicant is eligible for protection. 
As a result, even prima facie refugees, such as Syrians, 
are kept in a limbo not knowing whether they will 
receive protection in Greece or be deported to Turkey.6 
When GAS decides that an asylum application is 
inadmissible, this shifts protection responsibilities to 
Turkey. Because the question of whether or not Turkey can 
be considered a safe third country is highly controversial,7 
no individual has so far been deported to Turkey after 
5. The Greek Asylum Service currently fails to document the different 
access chances to protection status in, respectively, border procedures 
and standard procedures on the Greek mainland. 
6. By ‘prima facie refugees’, this Policy Brief refers to asylum seekers 
with an extremely high recognition rate. 
7. Amnesty International, 2017, Greece: Court decisions pave way for 
first forcible returns of asylum-seekers under EU-Turkey statement, 
retrieved: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/greece-
court-decisions-pave-way-for-first-forcible-returns-of-asylum-
seekers-under-eu-turkey-deal/
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an inadmissibility decision. All 1,360 individuals who 
were returned from Greece to Turkey from April 2016 
to October 2017 were returned on grounds other than 
inadmissibility.8
Applications from individuals from nationality 
groups with lower recognition rates are generally 
directly subjected to eligibility procedures.9 
In other words,  the  Greek  authorities  examine 
substantive claims for asylum only when the success 
chances are low. When chances for positive asylum 
decisions are high, the Greek authorities examine 
whether asylum seekers can be returned to Turkey to file 
their application there instead. This type of asylum case 
management prioritizes rejections and returns over the 
granting of refuge. The Greek authorities prioritize in 
particular the fast tracking of applications of individuals 
from nationality groups with asylum recognition rates 
below 25%.
Interviewed policy makers attribute low return rates and 
delays in asylum procedures to lengthy and numerous 
appeals. In a move to increase return rates, the Greek 
Ministry of Migration Policy, in March 2017, decided 
to limit the time to appeal first instance negative asylum 
decisions on Greek islands to five days. They also decided 
to exclude those who go into the second instance from 
future applications for IOM return programmes.10 
Even though appeals are crucial for refugee status 
determination, the new eligibility criteria for IOM return 
programmes discourages asylum seekers from using all 
available means to gain access to protection. As a result 
of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, 
procedural safeguards are being represented as 
bureaucratic hurdles that get in the way of efficient returns. 
Point 10 of the Joint Action Plan on the Implementation 
of the EU-Turkey Statement, for example, recommends 
that “Greek authorities [...] explore the possibility to 
8. As will be explained later in this brief, so far 216 Syrians felt obliged 
to accept a return to Turkey and 1,144 non-Syrians have been returned 
because they had been registered as either having “no will to apply for 
asylum”, because they withdrew their will to apply or their applica-
tion, because their case was closed for other reasons or because their 
asylum application was rejected on eligibility grounds.
9. Procedures have varied greatly over time and between different 
islands. Authorities also carry out so-called merged procedures in 
which admissibility and eligibility assessments are carried out at the 
same time.
10.  The official rationale for the change of eligibility criteria is to pre-
vent the so-called “abuse” of the asylum system.
limit the number of appeal steps in the context of the 
asylum process [...]”. The responsibility for lengthy appeal 
procedures, however, rests with the Greek government 
and not with asylum seekers who quite naturally appeal 
in their quest for protection.
Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality 
Lowers Asylum Recognition Rates
The statement’s drive for returns encourages 
discrimination on grounds of nationality for 
asylum seekers in Greece. In a quest to increase 
return rates, the Greek police on Lesbos has 
proceeded to systematically detain individuals from 
nationality groups with low asylum recognition rates 
immediately upon arrival in pre-removal centres.11 
This police practice is supposed to prevent the 
spontaneous movement of asylum seekers from the 
Greek islands to the Greek mainland and, from there, 
onwards to other EU member states. It violates, however, 
the right to individualized assessment prior to detention 
and systematizes the differential treatment of individuals 
based on their nationality.
Discrimination on grounds of nationality can lower 
asylum recognition rates in several ways. First, 
discrimination based on nationality reinforces 
presumptions about the outcome of asylum applications 
of individuals. An 18 June 2016 police circular describing 
the detention policy, for example, termed people from 
“low rate of recognition” nationalities as applicants 
with an “economic”, rather than “refugee profile.”12 
Second, discriminatory practices create practical 
barriers to asylum for concerned individuals. 
Access to legal aid and legal information is 
harder for asylum seekers who are in detention.13 
11. From December 2016 to May 2017, the police targeted individuals 
amongst others from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco 
and Egypt. The police resumed and this practice on a greater scale 
in August 2017. http://www.legalcentrelesbos.org/2017/09/30/sep-
tember-report-on-rights-violations-and-resistance-in-lesvos/
12. http://www.legalcentrelesbos.org/2017/09/30/september-report-
on-rights-violations-and-resistance-in-lesvos/.
13. Interview material from this study documents that people subject 
to this police practice did not receive detention decisions, thus vio-
lating Art. 5 ECHR. This finding is in line with a call by the EU’s Fun-
damental Rights Agency for improvement in individual assessments 
prior to people’s detention and for people’s access to information in 
pre-removal detention. Fundamental Rights Agency, November 2016, 
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A Pakistani man who was detained for two months, in 
late 2016, shared the following experience: “When we 
were inside, we never thought we had any rights. We had 
no information. Other detainees told me this jacket does 
this and that jacket does that.”14
While detained asylum seekers theoretically have a right 
to ask for a lawyer, they mostly are unable to communicate 
with police officers that serve as guards in the pre-
removal centres. The Greek police does not have its own 
translators and only commanders in the higher ranks 
speak English. IOM psychologists and social workers 
can enter the pre-removal centre, but are not trained or 
Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on 
fundamental rights in the ‘hotspots’ set up in Greece and Italy, p. 47- 
48.
14. Staff from different NGOs and international organizations wear 
different jackets to identify their professional affiliations.
mandated with the provision of legal information or aid.15 
UNHCR can speak to detainees through a fence when 
these are in the yard and not locked into their cells.16 
Beyond this, UNHCR and lawyers needs to make separate 
access requests with the police to be able to speak to 
individual asylum seekers in detention. 
As legal information and legal aid is crucial for access 
to asylum, the systematic detention of individuals 
from targeted nationality groups risks further lowering 
their asylum recognition rates, thus becoming a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The deterrent effect of detention for 
other aspiring migrants is not certain. In an interview, 
a Pakistani man who had been detained immediately 
upon arrival shared how he had advised relatives, after 
his release, to invest in a different smuggling route. While 
the Pakistani man had, in 2016, paid 4,000$ to reach the 
Greek islands, the son of his relative in 2017 gave 7,000$ 
to a smuggler to be brought straight to France.
15. While IOM psychologists can refer detainees to legal aid actors 
if detainees make explicit requests, they do not generally have suffi-
cient time or knowledge about procedural safeguards in the context of 
pre-removal detention to be able to pick up on potential human right 
violations on their own initiative.
16. Detainees are allowed to be at the yard only some hours per day 
and not all of them at the same time. Whether detained asylum seekers 
are able to reach out to UNHCR on their own initiative depends on 
whether they have access to the yard and the fence at the time of 
UNHCR’s visit.
Lesbos, August 2016, Photo: Saima Hassan
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The Hotspot Approach Forces Returns on 
Asylum Seekers
Research data from this study reveals that asylum seekers 
on the Greek islands felt forced to accept returns because 
conditions in the hotspots put the safety and health of 
their families at risk. Due to the geographical restriction 
of the EU-Turkey Statement, asylum seekers on the Greek 
islands are not allowed to go to the Greek mainland 
while their asylum application is handled and this can 
last for months or for years. As a result Greek hotspots 
are overcrowded. While Greek hotspots can officially 
accommodate 6,835 persons, the number of asylum 
seekers held there was almost double that in September 
2017.17 Interviewed asylum seekers experienced hotspots 
as being humiliating. Women mentioned that they did 
not feel safe to go to the toilet alone at night. The sub-
standard living conditions in hotspots can reinforce and 
worsen existing trauma of those who have fled wars and 
who have put their lives at risk during journeys across the 
Aegean Sea.18
17. European Commission, 2017, Seventh Report on the Progress 
made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, p. 7, 
retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/
sites/near/files/20170906_seventh_report_on_the_progress_in_the_
implementation_of_the_eu-turkey_statement_en.pdf
18. On Lesbos, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) psychologists carried 
out 767 mental health consultations and observed a marked deteriora-
tion in people’s mental health status immediately after the implemen-
tation of the EU-Turkey Statement. In particular, MSF psychologists 
saw a 2.5 fold increase in the percentage of patients with symptoms of 
anxiety and depression, and a threefold increase in the percentage of 
The trauma and stress of living in overcrowded hotspots 
have notably pushed 216 Syrians to accept returns to 
Turkey. A 32-year old Syrian man who accepted to return 
from Chios to Turkey with his pregnant wife in May 2016 
explained: “Tents were being burnt and there were fights 
every day. It was not safe at all. People from rightwing 
parties came and started throwing explosives on us. We 
never felt safe in this camp.” “I didn’t have any lawyer. No 
one was giving us any information. All the volunteers, 
organizations and even UNHCR were telling us that there 
was a high chance of being sent back to Turkey.” “We 
never got an interview date. We lost hope and decided to 
go back to Turkey.” Looking back, he adds: “I would not 
recommend anyone to return [to Turkey]. It was a very 
big mistake.”19
For asylum seekers blocked on the Greek islands, the 
situation in hotspots continues to be alarming in 2017 
and also drives non-Syrians with strong protection claims 
to give in to the pressure to return. In February 2017, for 
example, Bilisumma (pseudonym) decided to opt for the 
IOM’s return programme to Ethiopia: “I’ve decided to go 
back to Ethiopia. I know I could be put in prison and be 
tortured, but I’m in a prison here and people are dying in 
this prison, too.” Referring to Greek hotspots as prisons, 
Billisumma refers to suicides that occurred in Moria and 
Vial after the EU-Turkey Statement.20 Six hours after he 
patients with post-traumatic stress disorder over the year. Médecins 
Sans Frontières, 2017, “One year on from the EU-Turkey statement”, 
retrieved from: http://www.msf.org/en/article/one-year-after-eu-
turkey-deal-migrants-and-asylum-seekers-are-paying-price-their-
health
19. After ten months of living in a closed detention camp in Turkey, the 
young Syrian man returned to Syria together with his newly pregnant 
wife and baby in February 2017. At the time of the phone interview 
in August 2017, he was hiding from Al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda. See also, 
Alpes, M. J., Tunaboylu, S., and Ulusoy, O., (2017), “Post-deportation 
under the EU-Turkey Statement: What happens after readmission to 
Turkey?”, EUI Policy Brief.
20. The Fundamental Rights Agency lists two deaths, three rapes, 
and four suicide attempts between April and November 2016. Fun-
damental Rights Agency, November 2016, “Opinion of the Euro-
pean Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on fundamental rights 
in the ‘hotspots’ set up in Greece and Italy”, p. 40. Newspaper arti-
cles document at least five deaths before and during the winter 
of 2016: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38804002, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece/
third-migrant-dies-in-a-week-in-harsh-greek-camp-conditions-
idUSKBN15E1GW, http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/02/01/
housing-units-replace-tents-in-moria-after-series-of-deaths/, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/concern-spate-deaths-
greek-refugee-camps-170130180746859.html. NGOs and journalists 
Chios, August 2017, Photo: Maybritt Jill Alpes
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arrived in Ethiopia, Bilisumma was arrested while being 
reunited with his mother and family in Addis Ababa. He 
was taken to an Intelligence Agency site where he was 
beaten, insulted, and denied food.21
The IOM states that its returns must be voluntary and 
that this is a precondition for its activities.22 Nonetheless, 
addition, individuals on the Greek islands who sign up 
for IOM returns to countries of origin are detained in 
closed facilities immediately after their decision. They 
are handcuffed during transfers to the mainland and they 
are kept in pre-removal detention centres for a few weeks 
or months until their travel documents are processed. 
The Greek police justifies the use of such constraints 
by pointing to the risk of absconding and possible 
secondary movements. The empirical basis for this 
argument is inconclusive. IOM staff has so far accepted 
the constraints of the Greek police on the participants 
of its return programmes. The IOM in Greece also asks 
returnees to sign a form discharging the IOM and any 
other participating agency or government from liability 
or responsibility in the event of personal injury or death 
during and/or after return.23
also reported on a series of later suicide attempts and other deaths 
in 2017: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/03/death-and-despair-
lesbos, https://www.thenationalherald.com/156620/syrian-refugee-
self-immolates-delays-asylum-request/; http://infomobile.w2eu.
net/2017/01/29/death-in-greek-camps/.
21. Bilisumma was an active leader in the Oromo community and had 
been arrested and tortured by authorities prior to fleeing Ethiopia in 
2016. Without a guarantee of when his application for refugee status 
would be processed, Billisumma applied and was accepted to a uni-
versity in the United States. Because he was prohibited from leaving 
the island of Lesbos, he was unable to access the U.S. consulate to 
secure a visa. Bilisumma made the difficult decision to return to Ethi-
opia through the IOM in view of getting a visa for the U.S. from there. 
Lesbos Legal Center, 2017, Refugee voluntarily returned from Greece 
severely tortured upon arrival in Ethiopia, retrieved on 20/10/17 from: 
http://www.legalcentrelesbos.org/2017/06/16/refugee-voluntarily-
returned-from-greece-severely-tortured-upon-arrival-in-ethiopia/
22. IOM, Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration, 
retrieved from: https://www.iom.int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-
reintegration
23. Excerpt from IOM Voluntary Return Declaration and Authori-
zation for Collection of Personal Data (2017): “I hereby, for myself, 
as well as for my dependents, heirs and estate, release, discharge and 
agree to hold harmless IOM from any liability or damage caused, 
directly or indirectly, to me, my child or my family in connection with 
this authorization. I agree for myself, as well as for my dependents, 
heirs and estate, that in the event of personal injury or death during 
and /or after my participation in the IOM project, neither IOM, nor 
Insufficient Human Rights Monitoring 
Puts Refugees at Risk of Deportation
Existing monitoring efforts do not sufficiently guarantee 
that people with protection needs or vulnerabilities will 
not be deported to Turkey. The Greek Ombudsman has 
monitored a sample of return operations , but also gives 
to understand that they did not have “full and timely 
information about all stages of the returns / readmissions 
procedure, in order to be able to form a comprehensive 
picture [...]” for the investigation of specific incidents.24 
UNHCR on the Greek islands tries to access individuals 
prior to return operations, but its capacity to do so 
depends on the Greek police and whether they wish to 
share relevant information about people in pre-removal 
proceedings in a timely manner. The police notable does 
not inform UNHCR about the names of the persons 
included in a particular return operation, nor about 
their legal and asylum situation.25 The scope for human-
rights monitoring is further constrained as people in pre-
removal proceedings can be detained at local police posts 
or in pre-removal centres, both of which are handled by 
different administrative bodies. People’s police files are 
kept on the island where they first arrived, not on the 
island from which they are deported. And finally, lawyers 
who want to intervene at the third instance need to raise 
funds for punitively high administrative fees (roughly 
800 Euro per file). 
Human rights monitoring prior to deportations and 
returns is necessary for several reasons. First, despite 
considerable efforts by the authorities, people still lack 
any other participating agency or government can in any way be held 
liable or responsible.”
24. Greek Ombudsman, April 2017, Migration Flows and Ref-
ugee Protection: Administrative challenges and human rights 
issues, p. 39. Retrieved from: https://www.synigoros.gr/resources/
docs/greek_ombudsman_migrants_refugees_2017_en.pdf. In an 
October 2017 report, the Greek Ombudsman flags funding issues 
for its external monitoring work, as well as concerns about the 
internalization of monitoring responsibilities with the conversion 
of FRONTEX into a European Border and Coast Guard Agency. 
Greek Ombudsman, (September 2017), Return of Third Country 
Nationals, retrieved from https://www.synigoros.gr/?i=human-rights.
en.recentinterventions.457395.
25. Although UNHCR can see the detainees list and is aware of who is 
subject to removal, the police does not inform UNHCR about who is 
going to be readmitted each time. If for example 50 people are subject 
to return, UNHCR will know that ten will be returned on a specific 
date, but not who specifically is going to be returned on that date.
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legal information and legal aid and thus struggle to have 
their asylum application heard.26 For all return operations, 
an average of 36% of all individuals were registered as not 
having wanted to apply for asylum (see graph, Reasons 
for Return, April 2016- October 2017). On the first five 
return operations the share of people registered as not 
wanting to apply for asylum was even higher, raising 
questions about the validity of this registration (see 
graph, Reasons for Return – by Months). 17 out of 37 
individuals in this study’s sample, for example, were 
reportedly not given a chance to apply for asylum prior 
to their return.27 
A 19-year old Bengalese man deported on 21 May 2016 
said: “We tried many times to ask for asylum. We said 
that we have political issues back at home. But we didn’t 
get any response from them.” Three other interviewed 
returnees testified that they had been deported because 
officials in Greece had taken and not returned their asylum 
26. A lack of legal information and legal aid means, for example, that 
people fail to realize their right to re-open closed asylum applications 
(see graph, reasons for return) or to opt for the IOM’s return pro-
gramme to countries of origin instead of a deportation to Turkey. 
27. All cases concern returns that were part of the first five return 
operations from April 2016 to September 2016. In its September 2017 
report, the Greek Ombudsman flags that people are being returned 
with incomplete case files, which is an indicator for the potential 
disregard for the right to have one’s asylum request heard. Greek 
Ombudsman, (September 2017), Return of Third Country Nationals, 
p. 14, retrieved from https://www.synigoros.gr/?i=human-rights.
en.recentinterventions.457395.
registration cards. UNHCR, Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch and the Greek Council for Refugees 
documented similar cases.28
Second, it is almost impossible for people to get protection 
after deportation to Turkey. Between April 2016 and 
September 2017, only 57 out of 1,144 (non Syrian) 
deportees succeeded in filing an asylum application from 
within Turkish detention centres.29 At the same time, 
only 33% of all deportees had been able to complete their 
asylum application in Greece prior to their deportation 
to Turkey. Hence, most people who were deported 
28. Human Rights Watch, 19/04/2016, First Turkey deportations riddled 
with abuse, retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/19/
eu/greece-first-turkey-deportations-riddled-abuse. Greek Council 
for Refugees, 2016, the Implementation of the EU- Turkey agreement 
violates fundamental rights, retrieved from: http://www.gcr.gr/index.
php/en/news/press-releases-announcements/item/557-deltio-typou-
efarmogi-symfonias-ee-tourkias-kata-paravasi-themeliodon-dikaio-
maton. UNHCR, 21 October 2016, Concern over the return of 10 
Syrian asylum-seekers from Greece, retrieved from: http://www.
unhcr.org/news/briefing/2016/10/5809e78d4/unhcr-concern-illegal-
return-10-syrian-nationals-greece.html. Amnesty International, 28 
October 2016,Greece: Evidence points to illegal forced returns of 
Syrian refugees to Turkey, retrieved from: https://www.amnesty.org/
en/latest/news/2016/10/greece-evidence-points-to-illegal-forced-
returns-of-syrian-refugees-to-turkey/
29.  European Commission, Seventh Report on the Progress made 
in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, p. 5-6 retrieved 
from: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/
what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170906_sev-
enth_report_on_the_progress_in_the_implementation_of_the_eu-
turkey_statement_en.pdf
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to Turkey were not in possession of a negative asylum 
decision, but they were nonetheless unable to apply for 
asylum in Turkey. Syrians who return to Turkey can 
access temporary protection; but this legal status can be 
revoked at any time and does not, in practice, give them 
access to a work permit.30
Third, medical conditions and vulnerabilities that 
develop over time in hotspots are not reassessed prior 
to return operations. With asylum procedures delayed 
and living conditions in hotspots being poor, people 
can become depressed, suicidal or physically sick during 
their stay and thus should be exempted from returns.31 
In our study, we came across the case of a man who due 
to a lack of vulnerability screening almost got deported 
and thus separated from his unborn child and partner 
whom he had met on Lesbos. Due to a lack of effective 
human rights monitoring, another removal was only 
prevented by volunteers who were acquainted with and 
coincidentally nearby when an asylum seeker who was 
30. For more details on what happens with Syrians and non-Syrians 
who are readmitted from Greece to Turkey, see also Alpes, M. J., Tun-
aboylu, S., and Ulusoy, O., (2017), “Post-deportation risks under the 
EU-Turkey Statement: What happens after readmission to Turkey”, 
EUI Policy Brief; and Ulusoy, O., & Battjes, H. (2017). Situation of 
Readmitted Migrants and Refugees from Greece to Turkey under the 
EU-Turkey Statement. (Migration Law Series), p. 23-24, retrieved 
from https://rechten.vu.nl/en/Images/ UlusoyBattjes_Migration_
Law_Series_No_15_tcm248-861076.pdf.
31. Vulnerabilities are not always visible and hence require assess-
ments by medical and psychological staff.  MSF, 2017, Confronting 
the mental health emergency in Samos and Lesbos, p. 12 retrieved 
from: http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/2017_10_mental_
health_greece_report_final_low.pdf
not appeal rights exhausted was being escorted to return 
to Turkey. 
Human Rights Violations by Design
Human rights violations under the EU-Turkey 
Statement result from its design, not only bad and 
partial implementation. Defining returns as a political 
priority creates barriers to asylum, undermines human 
rights principles and forces asylum seekers to accept 
returns for a lack of viable alternatives. Even though 
policy makers are under a lot of pressure to make the 
EU-Turkey Statement appear as a success, the Statement 
does not work in practice. A sustainable EU approach 
to migration management would, instead, need to 
move from shifting responsibilities through returns 
to third countries, towards fairly sharing protection 
responsibilities both within the EU and globally. Sharing 
protection responsibilities according to economy and 
population size is both necessary and feasible.32 Despite 
its economically privileged position in the world, EU 
member states currently host very few of the world’s 0.3% 
world population who are refugees.33
In the absence of political will to fundamentally shift 
the narrative on protection responsibilities, the Greek 
government should stop the systematic detention of 
individuals from certain nationality groups upon arrival 
and ensure that migration related detention is in all cases 
based on an individual assessment of proportionality 
and necessity. It should also reverse the recent policy 
limiting a person’s eligibility for IOM return programmes 
in the case of appeals. The IOM should guarantee that 
participants in its voluntary return programmes will 
not be subjected to constraints, such as detention and 
handcuffs.
Rather than investing in the construction of pre-removal 
centres on the Greek islands, the EU should work together 
with Greece to move refugees out of the Greek islands. 
These should be taken to both the Greek mainland and to 
32. Responsibility sharing translates into creating and strength-
ening legal pathways to asylum, such as granting humanitarian visas, 
expanding resettlement programmes, and lifting bureaucratic hurdles 
for family reunification.
33. UNHCR, 2017, Figures at a glance, retrieved on 20/10/17 
from http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html and de Haas, 
22/08/16, Refugees small and relatively stable, retrieved on 20/10/17 
from: http://heindehaas.blogspot.fr/2016/08/refugees-small-and-rel-
atively-stable.html
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other European countries through relocation and family 
reunification. 34 In the absence of such steps, people will 
give up on regular routes and invest in human smugglers, 
rather than lawyers. The EU also needs to provide 
Greece with immediate and adequate support to ensure 
the dignified reception of those arriving on the Greek 
islands, as well as the timely and fair examination of all 
asylum claims on their merits and irrespective of people’s 
nationality. Access to legal assistance also needs to be 
strengthened. 
Finally, deportations from the EU border require 
comprehensive and effective human rights monitoring 
by a fully independent agency. For this, the Greek police 
needs to inform UNHCR and other bodies sufficiently 
ahead of time about the names of people and their legal 
and  asylum situation for specific scheduled  removal 
operations.
34. https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/joint-ngo-
letter-pm-tsipras_0.pdf
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